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Abstract
Because conflicts among social group members are inevitable, their management is crucial for group stability. The rarest
and most interesting form of conflict management is policing, i.e., impartial interventions by bystanders, which is of
considerable interest due to its potentially moral nature. Here, we provide descriptive and quantitative data on policing in
captive chimpanzees. First, we report on a high rate of policing in one captive group characterized by recently introduced
females and a rank reversal between two males. We explored the influence of various factors on the occurrence of policing.
The results show that only the alpha and beta males acted as arbitrators using manifold tactics to control conflicts, and that
their interventions strongly depended on conflict complexity. Secondly, we compared the policing patterns in three other
captive chimpanzee groups. We found that although rare, policing was more prevalent at times of increased social
instability, both high-ranking males and females performed policing, and conflicts of all sex-dyad combinations were
policed. These results suggest that the primary function of policing is to increase group stability. It may thus reflect prosocial
behaviour based upon ‘‘community concern.’’ However, policing remains a rare behaviour and more data are needed to test
the generality of this hypothesis.
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Introduction
Group living and hence sociality is a widespread phenomenon
among animals. Because groups are often composed of individuals
of different age, sex and relatedness, conflicts arise concerning
reproduction or access to resources. Such conflicts may dramat-
ically increase when groups are perturbed from the outside or
undergo changes in composition through dispersal or immigration.
Conflicts may disrupt group stability, so if individual fitness is
dependent on group stability [1], evolution should favour
mechanisms that decrease disruption [2,3].
Researchers have identified several mechanisms through which
social animals, especially nonhuman primates, manage conflicts,
including dominance [4], reconciliation [3], bystander affiliation
to recipients and/or initiators of aggression [5,6,7,8,9], mediation
[10], punishment [11,12] and policing [1,13]. The focus of this
paper is on events of policing, which we define as impartial
interventions by third parties in ongoing conflicts. Being impartial,
these interventions never include aggression directed specifically at
one of the contestants. Such policing is different from the common
partial bystander involvement in conflicts, which involves agonistic
support of one of the contestants. It is also different from
punishment [11], which concerns aggression directed specifically
at the wrongdoer. To emphasize the impartiality of the performers
of policing, we call them ‘‘arbitrators’’.
Policing has been reported in chimpanzees [14], bonobos [15],
mountain gorillas [16,17,18] and in captive Bornean orang-utans
[19,20]. Other species include the golden monkeys [21],
hamadryas baboons [22], and several macaques species such as
Barbary (A. Bissonnette; unpublished data), rhesus [23,24],
Japanese [25], pigtailed [13,26] and Tonkean macaques [27].
Policing is risky because it requires approaching two or more
fighting contestants, which may lead to becoming the recipient of
aggression [13]. Additionally, arbitrators may incur energy and
opportunity costs. To be favoured by natural selection, therefore,
policing should bring fitness benefits for the arbitrator. However,
the impartiality makes it difficult to recognize such direct fitness
benefits.
Various hypotheses have been proposed for the function of
policing in nonhuman primates. However, because policing is a
relatively rare behaviour among primates, the cross-species data
thus far has not consistently supported any functional hypothesis.
In this paper, we discuss the proposed hypotheses and develop
predictions for policing in chimpanzees, where conflicts often arise
among females over access to food [28] or among males over
access to females [29] and may result in severe dyadic or even
polyadic agonistic interactions [10].
The most popular hypothesis claims that policing brings only
indirect benefits to the arbitrator, because it serves to increase
group stability [30] by reducing the number of conflicts [13,30]
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social networks [1]. Increased group stability may indirectly
increase the arbitrator’s fitness via the reproductive benefits of
living in a stable network of beneficial relationships [26]. In terms
of proximate causation [31,32], policing might be motivated by a
concern about the conflicts of others and thus might reflect a basic
‘‘community concern’’ [33]. As a result, policing has been seen as
a precursor of human morality [33,34], and therefore may inform
of its evolution.
If the increase of group stability is the primary function of
policing, it should occur most often when group stability is
weakened (see Table 1 for predictions). Group instability may arise
due to major relationship changes, such as rank reversals near the
top of the hierarchy, death of an important social player, or
immigration/emigration. In such unstable circumstances, rela-
tionships are easily damaged and thus group stability is at stake.
First, the group stability hypothesis predicts that arbitrators are high-
ranking individuals because high-ranking individuals have the
power to effectively stop aggression [13] and simultaneously have
a lower risk of receiving aggression upon approaching combatants.
Second, it predicts that arbitrators can be both male and female
because both sexes have a stake in group stability. Social instability
in a group constitutes a major stress factor for all group members
as it has negative influences on social relationships and hence
various social interactions such as grooming, play and physical
contact [1] and also individual health [35,36]. Hence, all group
members have a stake in group stability but not all individuals
possess enough social power to control group stability. Third,
policing should occur in conflicts that are most likely to disrupt
relationships in a group, in particular those involving intensive
aggression involving multiple individuals. Finally, because of the
primacy of conflict intensity, policing should not be limited to
particular sex-dyad combinations.
Whereas the group stability hypothesis may indirectly increase the
arbitrator’s fitness, alternative hypotheses propose direct benefits.
Thus, a second hypothesis assumes that policing helps high-
ranking individuals to assert their social interests [37,38,39]. This
assurance of dominance hypothesis is supported in fallow deer (Dama
dama), where impartial interventions are a male strategy to control
other males’ social advance in the hierarchy [40,41]. The
hypothesis predicts for chimpanzees that arbitrators are high-
ranking males, and that policing occurs only in conflicts among
direct social competitors, i.e. in male-male conflicts. It does not
expect the same pattern for females because chimpanzee females
tend not to fight over rank.
A third hypothesis is that policing functions to assure sexual
benefits. It has been argued that in species where females transfer
between groups, males may police female-female conflicts to
discourage females from emigrating, and so preserve reproductive
payoffs for the policing males [39]. In addition, policing may
reduce stress faced by females due to aggressive conflicts. In
chimpanzees, as in other male-philopatric species, immigrant
females often meet aggressive resistance by resident females
[42,43,44,45] and male policing could make immigrants more
likely to stay in the group. Indeed, by policing such conflicts males
may also be able to establish and preserve valuable relationships
with the females without damaging their relationship with either
opponent [39,46]. This sexual benefits hypothesis predicts that policing
is always performed by males, who intervene only in female-female
conflicts.
Finally, policing may be directly self-serving in preventing
escalated aggression from ‘‘spilling over’’ to affect the policing
individual. In this case, we expect it to be performed by individuals
with the highest likelihood of being targets of aggression, i.e. low-
ranking individuals. However, given the potential risk of
intervening in agonistic interactions, the existing literature on
policing in various species does not support this protection from
aggression hypothesis, as arbitrators appear to be predominantly
high-ranking individuals [13,47,48]. Therefore, we will not
consider this hypothesis any further.
The aim of this study is to test the predictions of the three
hypotheses to identify the function of policing in chimpanzees (see
Tab. 1). The predictions focus on the identity of the arbitrators,
the kinds of dyads in which interventions are expected, and the
role of social instability. First, we report a detailed study of a
captive group of chimpanzees (Gossau) with a high level of social
instability and a high rate of policing, which allowed us to directly
test the aforementioned hypotheses. This represents the first
systematic study of chimpanzee policing, which so far has been
reported on a rather anecdotal level in the literature [14,47,49].
Second, we compare the policing patterns found in Gossau with
three other captive chimpanzee groups (Basel, Chester, Arnhem).
The comparison relies on data collected earlier for other research
purposes. Therefore, the policing data are extracted from the
records post hoc. This comparison allowed us to assess the generality
of the findings of the first part regarding the identity of arbitrators,
sex-dyad combinations of policed conflicts and, qualitatively, the
social conditions in which policing occurred.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The main study conformed to all regulations regarding the
ethical treatment of animals and was formally approved by the
veterinary office of St. Gallen, Switzerland. All zoos mentioned in
this paper belong to the EAZA (European Association of Zoo and
Aquaria) and therefore comply with their welfare requirements.
Furthermore, they follow the guidelines contained in the Weath-
erall Report for the use of nonhuman primates in research.
Animals were never separated from each other for the purpose of
the studies mentioned here. We did not induce any aggression and
all data were collected observationally on behaviour that occurred
spontaneously.
Table 1. The proposed hypotheses and their predictions for the function of impartial interventions in chimpanzees.
Hypotheses Conditions of policing Who are the arbitrators? Policed sex-dyad combinations
The group stability hypothesis Presence of social instability High-ranking individuals of both sexes Conflicts of all sex-dyad combinations
with high escalation potential
The assurance of dominance hypothesis Decrease in dominance possible
(e.g. old age, social climber)
High-ranking males Male-male
The assurance of sexual benefits hypothesis Immigration of females High-ranking males Female-female
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032494.t001
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Study Subjects and Housing. Data were collected from a
captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) group housed in an indoor-
outdoor facility (indoor facility: 26150 m
2, outdoor facility:
26450 m
2) at the Abenteuerland Walter Zoo (Gossau),
Switzerland. The group consisted of 11, mainly captive-born,
individuals, two adult males and one adolescent male, six adult
females and two adolescent females. This reflects the group
composition in the beginning of February 2007, after the
introduction of three new adult females. For further details on
the individuals, see supporting information (SI) Table S1. Shortly
after data collection had started, three adult females from another
group were introduced into the main study group. In addition,
there was a rank reversal between two males taking place. These
events resulted in social instability during the study period (see
Methods: Rank Hierarchy and Stability for details).
Data Collection and Analysis. Data were collected on the
whole group over 22 hours in February 2007 by AZ and over
564 hours from May 2007–November 2008 by CRvR, using all
occurrence and scan sampling [50]. Observations took place
throughout the day while the chimpanzees were in the indoor or
outdoor enclosures, and included all occurrences of social
interactions such as affiliation, aggressive conflicts, dominance
and sexual interactions, as well as third-party behaviour. The
ethogram used in this study was based on van Hooff [51]. For
further details on the ethogram, see Table S2.
We recorded subordination signals to determine an individual’s
dominance rank. The chimpanzee’s most obvious subordination
signal is the pant grunt. This vocalisation is always directed up the
hierarchy [52,53]. Other subordination signals included in the
determination of dominance hierarchy were avoidance, fleeing
and presenting behaviour. In total, we collected 1299 subordina-
tion signals. The Elo-rating method [54,55], ran in the statistical
environment R (Version 2.12.1) [56], was used to investigate and
visualize individual dominance rank and rank instability. For each
individual we chose a starting value of 1000 and a constant k=200
was used. This allowed us to establish the hierarchy among males
and females and to detect rank instability.
Factors influencing the occurrence of policing were analyzed
using generalized linear mixed effects models (GLMM) [57]. We
chose eight factors that we thought as most likely to be important in
influencinga chimpanzee’sinterventionbehaviour.Foranoverview
and descriptions of the fixed and random factor(s), see Table S3.
Conflict characteristics (directionality, intensity, complexity), iden-
tity of conflict participants (maternal kin, ‘‘friend’’, immigrant
female), class of conflict (sex-dyad combination) and identity of
arbitrator (male) were entered as fixed factors. Paternal kin was not
included as a factor in the GLMM because maternal relatedness
results in stronger bonds than paternal relatedness [58,59] and
because of a lack of strong evidence of paternal kin identification
mechanisms in primates, including chimpanzees [60]. The date of
data collection was entered as a random factor. GLMMs were fitted
with lme4 [61] using the glmer procedure in the statistical
environment R (Version 2.12.1) [56] with binomial error structure.
To assess ‘‘friendships’’ among individuals, a social proximity
scan including social grooming was performed every 5 minutes,
recording each individual’s distance to each other individual if the
individuals were not moving and all social grooming. We collected
96 scan samples in February 2007 and 3472 scan samples from
May 2007–November 2008. Social grooming and close proximity
were used to calculate a composite index of sociality (CIS) for each
dyad (N=55dyads) [58]. Grooming and proximity are commonly
used to proxy ‘‘friendship’’ or close social bonds in primate groups
[62]. In chimpanzees, grooming and proximity reflect the value
dimension of social relationships. While social relationships also
encompass other relationship quality dimensions, namely compat-
ibility and security [63], we did not include them in the analyses
for two reasons. First, security measures were not recorded in data
collection, and second, value was considered as a more directly
important variable than compatibility (‘‘friendliness’’) in a decision
of whether or not to police a conflict. The dyads for which CIS
was below 1.5 were classified as having a weak social bond, or to
be ‘‘non-friends’’ [56]. The dyads with CIS equal to or above 1.5
(18.2% of all dyads) were classified as having a strong social bond
and hence were classified as ‘‘friends’’.
Rank Hierarchy and Stability. For a better overview, we
only plot the most dominant individuals (Ces, Dig, Dan, Chi, Tzi),
see Figure 1. We found that by the end of February 2007 – about
one month after the introduction of the three new females – Ces
occupied the alpha position, just as he had been before the
introduction and for several years before the current study (zoo
staff, pers. comm.). The youngest male Dig (15 yrs) had begun to
challenge the then alpha male Ces before the introduction (zoo
staff, pers. comm.), but was not yet successful in defeating Ces. In
May 2007, Ces was observed to submit formally to Dig, indicating
that a rank reversal was in progress between these two males and
that it must have started between February and May 2007. The
two immigrants females (Chi and Tzi) aimed for a high position in
the hierarchy and were able to establish themselves in high rank
positions. By the end of November 2007, Dig had established
himself in the alpha position and remained there until the end of
data collection in November 2008. The immigrant females ranked
at that time right below Ces (see Fig. 1). Figure 1 visualizes the
rank instability during the first few months after the introduction
among the highest-ranking individuals.
Part II
Study Subjects and Data Collection. We compare the
policing pattern found in Gossau with data from three other captive
chimpanzee groups: Basel, Chester and Arnhem (Burgers) Zoos.
Except in Basel, the data on impartial interventions were extracted
post-hoc from earlier studies for the present analysis, and only
physical interventions were included (physical nonaggressive but
impartial separation, or run-through). Table 2 provides an overview
of policing events of all groups. Basel Zoo, Switzerland, houses 10
chimpanzees (two adult males, four adult females, three infants and
one juvenile female) in a well-established social group. The
operational definition of policing was identical to the main study.
Conflicts were recorded ad libitum during 3 months (March–May
2009) by CRvR. During the study, male ranks were unstable. The
alpha male was very old, and the other younger male had started to
challenge him. The males did not associate with or groom each
other. Females were equally submissive to both males.
Chester Zoo, UK, houses a well-established social group whose
size has varied from 26 to 32 chimpanzees (17 adult females, five
adult males and four to 10 infants and juveniles) over the years. Here
we assess data collected in two phases. The first phase ‘‘Chester (1)’’
spans three years (January 2000–January 2003), during which
conflicts were observed ad libitum by CC. This period was
characterized by an initially unstable male dominance hierarchy,
whichhowever stabilized duringthecourse of the study. However,we
do not have data to formally assess the male dominance hierarchy, so
the instability is based on qualitative assessment of the group
dynamics. The second phase ‘‘Chester (2)’’ consists of a detailed study
on within-group aggression during 2005 and 2006, including 18
months of ad libitum sampling of conflicts by ONF. This period was
highly stable, as reflected by the fact that hardly any formal signals of
subordinance were given (ONF, unpublished data).
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a well-established social group of 23–35 individuals (three to five
adult males, 14–18 adult females, zero to six adolescents, four to
eight infants and juveniles). Conflicts were observed ad libitum
over the course of three years (June 2002–August 2005) by SEK
and her students. Although the study was nearly continuous, the
data are here divided into two phases ‘‘Arnhem (1)’’ and ‘‘Arnhem
(2)’’ due to a difference in group stability. ‘‘Arnhem (1)’’ was
characterized by instability, caused by the death of an adult female
and the removal of an adult male, who shared the alpha position
with his brother. Following his removal, a young male, previously
fourth in rank, took over the alpha position (all these events
occurred between December 2002 and January 2003). During the
subsequent months, until August 2003, male rank was unstable, as
indicated by inconsistent submission signals by both males and
females. ‘‘Arnhem (2)’’ combines observations prior to the death
and rank reversal (June–October 2002) and after the rank had
stabilized (August 2003–August 2005). During these periods male
rank was stable and no incidents of social instability occurred.
Results
Part I
Conflicts, Arbitrators and Frequency of Policing. We
observed 438 conflicts of which 202 (46.1%) were female-female,
186 (42.5%) male-female and 50 (11.4%) male-male. 26 (5.9%)
conflicts were polyadic. Conflicts between resident and immigrant
females occurred regularly and accounted for the largest number
of conflicts (173 cases; 39.5%). Policing occurred in 69 conflicts
(15,75%) and consisted of 38 female-female, 27 male-female and 4
male-male conflicts. This did not differ from the overall
distribution of conflicts among sex-classes (x
2 (2)=2.94, P=
0.23). On eight occasions, the two males performed impartial
interventions simultaneously.
Policing was exclusively restricted to two males, Ces (N=44)
and Dig (N=25). The third male Dan never engaged in this
behaviour. Notably, when Ces was the alpha male, he intervened
in 11 conflicts, whereas Dig only started to police conflicts in May
2007. Of the 69 policing events we observed during data
collection, Dig intervened in 10 (40%) female-female conflicts, in
12 (48%) male-female conflicts and in three (12%) male-male
conflicts. Ces performed in total 44 impartial interventions, of
which 28 (63.6%) were in female-female conflicts, 15 (34.1%) were
in male-female conflicts and one (2.3%) was in a male-male
conflict.
Tactics and Success of Policing. Policing tactics included
passive as well as active interventions. Passive interventions were
called attendance and defined as a third party approaching a
conflict in a directed manner until within a short distance showing
no other behaviour [13]. This type of intervention was observed in
31 cases (44.93%). Active interventions ranged from threatening
both antagonists simultaneously in two cases (2.9%), to
Table 2. Overview of the impartial interventions of all groups.
Social instability N Conflicts Policing (%)
Sex-dyad combination of policed
conflicts Arbitrators
Gossau Yes 438 15.75 All sex-dyad combinations High-ranking males
Basel Yes 66 6 Female-female High-ranking males
Chester (1) Yes 4000 0.2 Female-female, male-male High-ranking females, large mid-ranking
male
Chester (2) No 256 0 n/a n/a
Arnhem (1) Yes 376 2.7 All sex-dyad combinations High-ranking males and females
Arnhem (2) No 365 0.8 Female-female, male-male High-ranking males and females, a young
male (social climber)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032494.t002
Figure 1. Elo-ratings of the highest-ranking individuals of the study group in Gossau for the time range of February 2007 until the
end of the study in November 2008. Each line represents an individual. Each symbol represents an Elo-rating after they were updated following
an interaction of the depicted individual. Dotted lines indicate the time range of rank instabilities in the study group. Note: No data collection was
performed in March and April 2007.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032494.g001
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conflict in 26 cases (37.68%). Interpositions were defined as a third
party standing between the antagonists and ‘‘running through’’ as
a third party running between the antagonists. In six cases (8.7%),
one male threatened both conflict participants simultaneously
while the other ‘‘ran through’’ the conflict.
We considered policing successful if it immediately terminated a
conflict. Of the 69 impartial interventions, 60 (86.96%) were
successful and nine (13.04%) were not. All eight impartial
interventions that were performed simultaneously by the two
males were successful. The number of times policing was
unsuccessful per individual was four and five, respectively. The
males received only once aggression in response to policing,
indicating that combatants may have regarded arbitrators as
authorities.
Determinants of Policing. To investigate whether the two
arbitrators followed different strategies when intervening, we
included in the GLMMs all fixed factors and all two-way
interactions with arbitrator (male). Since the model with all two-
way interactions with male did not converge, we added only one
interaction at a time and used the Akaike’s Information Criterion
[64] to select the model with the best fit to the data [65]. Thereby,
only interactions that reduced the AIC by .2 units were included
[66]. The selected model contained all fixed factors and the class x
male interaction and had an AIC of 328.3. The AICs of the
excluded models ranged between 334.9 and 332.9 and were
significantly different from the selected model (Log-Likelihood
Ratio Tests:
Dx
2(1)=8.589, P=0.003;
Dx
2(2)=8.631 P=0.01,
respectively). The overall significance of the selected model against
the null model, including only the intercept and the random factor
was also tested [65]. The null model (AIC=337.68) was
significantly different from the selected model (Log-Likelihood
Ratio Test:
Dx
2(12)=33.387, P,0.001). Therefore, the selected
model explained significantly more variance in the data than the
excluded models as well as the null model. Table 3 shows the
parameter estimates of the selected model. We present the
Bayesian credible intervals [67] of the significant parameter
estimates in addition to the z-test, since the z-test is only an
approximation and could therefore be misleading [68]. The 95%
credible intervals show that polyadic conflicts had a significantly
higher probability of attracting impartial intervention than dyadic
conflicts (see Fig. 2a). Furthermore, the males differed to some
extent regarding which class of conflict they preferred to intervene
in. The younger male Dig showed a trend to intervene
preferentially in male-male conflicts compared to the other
classes (see Fig. 2b).
In sum, two of the three males performed policing and were
effective in ending the conflicts. They policed conflicts among all
sex-dyad combinations, although one male tended to intervene
more often in male-male conflicts, and policing was most likely
executed when a conflict involved multiple combatants.
These results made it possible to refute the assurance of sexual
benefits hypothesis, but did not allow us to distinguish between the
group stability hypothesis and the assurance of dominance
hypothesis, as one male tended to intervene in male-male conflicts.
Therefore, we followed up the study with a cross-zoo comparison
on policing behaviour.
Part II
Table 2 summarizes the results of the comparison of the groups.
The overall pattern is mostly consistent with the group stability
hypothesis, although there were differences among the zoos in
policing patterns. First, only the group stability hypothesis predicts
that high-ranking individuals of both sexes should engage in
policing. In Basel, all policing was exclusively performed by the
alpha and beta male, which were the two only adult males in this
group. In Chester, a mid-ranking male, who was the largest male
in the group, and two high-ranking females were responsible for
the policing. In Arnhem, high-ranking males and females
performed all but one of the interventions. In 10 of 13 cases the
arbitrator was the alpha, beta or gamma male, and in two cases it
was a high-ranking female. In one case the arbitrator was a lower
ranking male, who was rapidly rising in rank.
Second, only the group-stability hypothesis predicts that
arbitrators intervene in interactions, regardless of sex-dyads
combinations, rather than exclusively in male-male (assurance of
dominance hypothesis) or female-female (sexual benefits hypoth-
esis) dyads. In Basel, all policed conflicts were dyadic female-
female conflicts (N of all conflicts: female-female: 34; male-female:
23; male-male: one; adult-immature: eight). In Chester, of the seven
policed conflicts, six were female-female and one was male-male.
In Arnhem, five female-female, six male-female and two male-
male conflicts were policed. In sum, across these three groups,
agonistic interactions involving both sexes and all three possible
combinations were subject to interventions by arbitrators, and
arbitrators were males and females, a pattern most consistent with
the group stability hypothesis.
The group stability hypothesis also predicts that intensive or
otherwise escalation-proneconflictsarepoliced.Thispredictionwas
supported in Gossau and Basel. In Chester, most policing occurred
in moderate to severely aggressive dyadic conflicts. In Arnhem,
eight out of 13 policed conflicts were severely aggressive, four of
which polyadic, and the remaining five were dyadic conflicts with
mild physical aggression. Thus, the majority, but not all, of the
policed conflicts involved severe aggression, but there was no
consistent bias towards polyadic conflicts as found in Gossau.
Finally, the degree of social instability is predicted to increase
occurrence of policing. As the degree of social instability could not
be assessed quantitatively, we estimated the presence and absence
of instability in the three zoos qualitatively, based on aggression
Table 3. Factors in the selected model (GLMM) explaining the
occurrence of impartial interventions in arbitrators.
Fixed factors Estimate Std. Error z value P (.|z|)
(Intercept) 22.896 1.272 22.277 0.023*
Directionality unidirec 20.471 0.518 20.909 0.364
Intensity low 20.125 0.454 20.274 0.784
Complexity polyadic 4.627 0.997 4.641 3.47e-06***
Maternal kin yes 20.348 1.141 20.305 0.760
Friend no 0.957 1.056 0.906 0.365
Friend yes 0.388 0.898 0.432 0.666
Immigrant female yes 20.265 0.542 20.489 0.624
Class mf 0.373 0.659 0.567 0.571
Class mm 24.299 2.551 21.686 0.092.
Male Dig 20.941 0.642 21.466 0.143
Class mf6male Dig 0.339 0.842 0.402 0.687
Class mm6male Dig 8.264 3.058 2.703 0.007**
Significance codes:
‘‘***’’0.001.
‘‘**’’0.01.
‘‘*’’0.05.
‘‘.’’ 0.1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032494.t003
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indicating instability of male dominance hierarchy. Policing was
relatively more common in Arnhem (1) than in Arnhem (2).
Similarly, it was relatively more common in Chester (1) than in
Chester (2). Finally, policing was remarkably frequent in Basel,
reaching almost the same values as in Gossau. Overall, therefore,
policing was most likely at times of social instability. This further
corroborates the group stability hypothesis.
Discussion
We explored impartial interventions, i.e. policing, as a conflict
management mechanism in chimpanzees. We addressed three
hypotheses for the function of policing in chimpanzees: a group-
stabilizing function, consistent with an expression of ‘‘community
concern’’ by the arbitrators; male assurance of dominance by
prohibiting rise of social competitors; and male assurance of sexual
benefits by alleviating female-female aggression and simultaneous-
ly improving own relationship with females.
In the main study, we found that only adult, high-ranking males
performed policing and they policed conflicts of all sex-dyad
combinations. The primary predictor of policing was conflict
complexity, in that polyadic conflicts were policed more often than
dyadic ones. The occurrence of policing across all sex-dyad
combinations does not support the assurance of dominance
hypothesis or the assurance of sexual benefits hypotheses, but is
consistent with the group stability hypothesis. Moreover, the high
prevalence of policing coincided with social instability in the
group, i.e. the introduction of three adult females and a rank
reversal between the two top-ranking males. Thus, social
relationships were unstable and easily disturbed. Policing as a
group stabilizer may have prevented conflicts from escalating,
thereby preventing further disruption of group stability.
However, as all policing in Gossau was performed by adult
males, and one of them showed a tendency to police male-male
conflicts, we could not distinguish between the group stability
hypothesis and the assurance of dominance hypothesis. Therefore,
we conducted a broader evaluation of the hypotheses by
combining policing data from three other captive groups. The
comparative data added support for the group stability hypothesis.
High-ranking individuals of both sexes performed the vast
majority of policing, and they intervened in conflicts among all
sex-dyad combinations. Moreover, although policing was rare
overall, policing was more likely during times of social instability.
These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis of a group-
stabilizing function.
Available reports from wild chimpanzees give further support to
this hypothesis. In both Mahale and Gombe National Parks
[47,48,69], arbitrators were high-ranking individuals of both sexes
[28], conflicts of all sex-dyad combinations were policed and, at
least in Mahale, occurred at times of social instability. Altogether,
it appears plausible that the main function of policing in
chimpanzees is to stabilize group dynamics.
The data did not support the two alternatives proposing a direct
fitness benefit to the interveners. Moreover, an alternative
possibility to explain policing, namely that arbitrators merely
dislike noisy disturbances and take action to stop them [12,52],
also seems unlikely because policing is relatively rare while noisy
conflicts occur frequently.
The results stressed the importance of social power in effective
policing. In Gossau, arbitrators exhibited a high success rate of
policing (86.96%) and almost never received aggression in
response to their behaviour. The near-absence of aggression
towards arbitrators is not surprising given their high social ranks.
In the other zoos too, the arbitrators were high-ranking in nearly
all cases, and in the only two exceptions (once in Chester and once
in Arnhem) they were nevertheless individuals of potential social
importance. The fact that mostly high ranking individuals engaged
in policing is consistent with the theoretical models of Frank
[30,70,71] and the empirical work in pigtailed macaques of Flack
Figure 2. Plots showing the 95% credible intervals for a) complexity of a conflict (dyadic vs. polyadic) and for b) the interaction
between class of conflict (sex-dyad combination) and identity of arbitrator (male).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032494.g002
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neities in the tendency to police. The more powerful an individual
is, the more effective it is in controlling a conflict and this at a low
cost [72].
An interesting exception to this pattern was seen in Gossau,
where the introduced females, despite being high-ranking and
large-bodied, did not engage in policing. We think that this might
be explained by the fact that as newcomers, they were not yet fully
accepted by the others and thus did not hold the necessary social
power. Alternatively, the immigrant females may have lacked the
motivation to police, if they did not yet regard the group as their
‘‘own’’. Another limiting factor might have been the fact these
females conceived soon after the introduction and subsequently
carried vulnerable infants.
When policing, arbitrators in Gossau used different tactics,
mainly preferring to literally ‘‘run through’’ the conflict thereby
separating the combatants, or to attend the conflict (see Results:
Tactics of Policing for definition). For the latter tactic to be effective,
arbitrators need to be perceived by all combatants as being more
powerful than themselves. Similarly, various policing behaviours
were seen in Arnhem and Chester. However, we could reliably
extract only policing events that involved clear physical involve-
ment. Thus, the overall prevalence may have been underestimated
by excluding the passive attendance-type of interventions.
However, we think these conclusions are not affected by this
possible bias, because passive interventions are likely to have been
done by high-ranking individuals, as in Gossau.
Policing occurs only rarely in chimpanzees, which is probably
why its function has remained elusive to researchers. We
hypothesize that several preconditions are necessary for impartial
interventions to occur regularly. First, conflicts that occur in a
group must have the potential to endanger group stability. This is
probably not the limiting factor in chimpanzees, where intensive,
polyadic conflicts occur regularly. Second, relationship stability in
a group must be challenged, leading to increased likelihood of
disruption by conflicts. This aspect may explain why policing is so
rare. Several effective, mainly dyadic, conflict management
mechanisms exist in the chimpanzee behavioural repertoire,
which may suffice maintaining group stability under normal
conditions. However, rank reversals among the highest-ranking
individuals, or significant demographic changes such as the
removal or addition of adults may promote conditions in which
policing emerges. Third, a group needs to include individuals that
possess sufficient authority and power to successfully control
conflicts. Gaining authority may be associated with long-term
membership and high rank in the group, and given chimpanzee
socio-ecology, lack of authoritative individuals is probably not the
explanation for scarcity of policing in chimpanzees. However,
personality may influence the individual tendency to engage in
policing. High-ranking individuals are not necessarily all equally
likely to be involved in group activities [73]. Future studies should
explore whether chimpanzees change their policing strategy
during their lifetime as they rise or fall in rank, whether it is
dependent on the group composition, and whether it is determined
by individual personality of the arbitrators.
Increase of group stability by active policing may be rooted in a
basic ‘‘community concern’’, i.e. the motivation to maintain stable,
harmonious dynamics in a group [33]. Although there may also be
additional, self-serving benefits at the proximate level (e.g. females
may prefer males that engage in policing as mates and allies [14]),
group-stabilizing policing may be driven by a pacifying motivation
and as such, can be considered as prosocial behaviour.
In humans, community concern is expressed in its highest
degree and can be seen as the very foundation of human morality
and indeed social norms. Thus, in humans, as in chimpanzees,
community concern may constitute one of the proximate
mechanisms for conflict management, which likely is independent
of its ultimate goal of group stability, which in turn increases fitness
of group members. Thus, from a proximate perspective, policing
behaviour may be genuinely prosocial in that arbitrators perform
it without self-serving motives [32,74].
Theoretical and empirical studies on the emergence of human
large-scale cooperation have shown that one of the important
mechanisms is the existence of punishment, either directly or
through externalized ‘‘pool-punishment’’ forces [75]. Institution-
alized pool-punishing by law enforcement effectively maintains
cooperation through social norms [76]. Nonhuman primates,
despite the existence of small-scale cooperation, social learning
and potentially proto-normative behaviour [77], do not exert
direct or pool-punishment. Neither do most small-scale human
foragers [78]. Thus, the policing as a conflict management
mechanism seen among nonhuman primates might be a precursor
for large-scale ‘‘police forces’’ that maintain normative behaviour
in large-scale human societies.
In conclusion, we found that although policing behaviour is
overall rare, it occurs in several chimpanzee groups. Its frequency
appears to increase at times of social instability. High-ranking
individuals of both sexes police conflicts, and all sex-dyad
combinations of conflicts are policed. The higher the conflict’s
disruption potential (i.e. polyadic and/or severe aggression), the
more likely it is policed. This was especially shown in the main
study, in which we could assess the occurrence of policing with a
predictive model. We hypothesized that high rates of policing are
due to considerable social instability, which may disrupt the
group’s social structure. Policing was highly effective in stopping
conflicts. These results suggest that the main function of policing is
to maintain the group’s social stability. This behaviour may reflect
arbitrator’s pacifying motivation in the form of a basic
‘‘community concern’’.
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